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In the past two decades, the field of authoritarian politics has grown substantially. This commentary surveys the major
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Keywords
authoritarian politics; authoritarian regimes; autocracies; dictatorships
Issue
This commentary is part of the issue “Authoritarianism in the 21st Century”, edited by Natasha Ezrow (University of
Essex, UK).
© 2018 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
Dictatorships govern about 40% of the world’s countries
today (Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2014). Though democ-
racy spread across much of the globe after the end of
the Cold War, it did not take root everywhere. Many
long-standing dictatorships withstood the chaos that ac-
companied the fall of the Soviet Union, such as those in
China and North Korea, and many new democracies that
emerged at this time slowly reverted back to authoritar-
ian rule afterwards, such as Russia by 1993 and Arme-
nia by 1994. Still, even after the post-Cold War dust set-
tled in the mid-1990s, democracies outnumbered their
authoritarian counterparts by about two to one. That
said, there are indications that authoritarianism is set to
make a come back. According to the watchdog organiza-
tion Freedom House’s 2018 report assessing global po-
litical rights and civil liberties, democracy has suffered
12 consecutive years of decline (Freedom House, 2018).
Despite the optimism of modernization theorists many
decades ago (Lipset, 1959), authoritarian regimes do not
appear to be going away any time soon.
Perhaps in response to this reality, the field of author-
itarian politics has expanded considerably in the past two
decades or so. Whereas historically research on democ-
racies far outpaced that on dictatorships—at least par-
tially due to the difficulties inherent in studying author-
itarian regimes—this is decreasingly the case. This com-
mentary surveys the major developments in the litera-
ture on authoritarian politics, summarizes the key find-
ings, and highlights the key debates that have emerged
in response.
2. The Evolution of Research on Dictatorships
Research on dictatorships has in many ways evolved in
line with changes in the nature of authoritarian rule we
have witnessed over the course of the last century. In re-
sponse to the emergence of regimes such as Nazi Ger-
many under Adolf Hitler and the Soviet Union under
Josef Stalin, for example, scholars focused on the con-
cept of totalitarianism. Totalitarian regimes are dictator-
ships led by a single political party that feature a highly
cohesive ideology and an all-encompassing secret police
(Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1956). The goal of such regimes is
to fundamentally transform society through state propa-
ganda and coercion. Research on totalitarianism primar-
ily emphasized the characteristics of these regimes, as
well as the factors that enabled their emergence, such
as the social isolation citizens experienced following pe-
riods of crisis (Arendt, 1951).
Following World War II and the collapse of colonial
empires around the globe, a new crop of dictatorships
formed, many of which bore little in common to the to-
talitarian regimes identified in the literature. Many of
these new dictatorships featured a single, dominant po-
litical party, but—unlike their totalitarian counterparts—
they did not seek societal conversion to meet an ide-
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ological goal. Many of these regimes sprouted on the
heels of independence movements, such as Kenya un-
der the Kenyan African National Union (1963 to 2002)
and Singapore under the People’s Action Party (1965 to
the present). In response to these developments, schol-
ars sought to explain the different features of dominant
parties and how they influence regime strength, with the
intensity and duration of the party’s struggle to assume
power identified as critical (Huntington & Moore, 1970).
As the Cold War heated up in the 1970s and global
superpowers devoted greater military resources to de-
veloping countries to secure their support, military dic-
tatorships took power in many parts of the developing
world, including Brazil (1964 to 1985), Nigeria (1967 to
1979), and Thailand (1977 to 1988). In conjunction with
this trend, scholars turned their attentions toward differ-
entiating military dictatorships, primarily based on the
ambitions of the ruling junta in terms of their intent to
rule indefinitely or step down after bringing the country
order (Perlmutter, 1977).
Many dictatorships also emerged at this time that
looked like military dictatorships, because the leader
wore a military uniform, but were governed differently
because the military institution lacked any de facto in-
fluence over policy. Examples include Uganda under Idi
Amin (1971 to 1979) and Iraq under Saddam Hussein
(1979 to 2003). In response, scholars also delved into the
nature of strongman rule—often referred to as personal-
ist dictatorship—where all power lands in the hands of
a single individual. Research on this form of dictatorship
emphasized the tendency for such leaders to steal from
the state, erode state institutions, and put their countries
on paths toward political decay (Decalo, 1985).
Following the end of the Cold War, geopolitical pres-
sures for countries to pursue political liberalization—
often linked to foreign aid—led to significant changes
in terms of what the “typical” dictatorship looked like.
Whereas only around half of all dictatorships in power
during the Cold War featured legislatures and multi-
party electoral competition, today the vast majority
of them do (Kendall-Taylor & Frantz, 2014). These dy-
namics led scholars to unpack the purposes of pseudo-
democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes, with
a key finding to emerge being that they tend to en-
hance authoritarian survival (Gandhi, 2008). These devel-
opments have generated new questions and debates, a
subject to which I now turn.
3. Key Debates in the Field
There undoubtedly exist a plethora of unresolved de-
bates in the field of authoritarian politics; this commen-
tary focuses on the two that—in my view—are the most
relevant to a broad swathe of the literature.
The first has to do with classification and measure-
ment. Classifications of dictatorships fall into two cat-
egories: categorical and continuous (Ezrow & Frantz,
2011). Categorical typologies view dictatorships as
equally authoritarian, with the key distinction of inter-
est being various features of their rule. Examples include
classifications of dictatorships as civilian, monarchic, or
military (Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2010), or per-
sonalist, monarchic, dominant-party, or military (Geddes
et al., 2014). Continuous typologies, by contrast, see au-
thoritarianism as a linear concept, such that systems can
be placed on a scale ranging from fully authoritarian to
fully democratic. Examples include the broad array of ty-
pologies that emphasize hybrid political systems, often
referred to as grey zone (Diamond, 2002), competitive
authoritarian (Levitsky &Way, 2002), or electoral author-
itarian (Schedler, 2006), as well as the measures often
used to capture these concepts, such as combined Polity
scores (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2017) and Freedom
House civil liberties and political rights scores (Freedom
House, 2018).
The distinction between the two typologies may
seem unimportant, but is actually quite consequential
and the subject of substantial discussion (see, for exam-
ple, Cheibub et al., 2010; Kailitz, 2013; Wahman, Teorell,
& Hadenius, 2013). One of the messages to come out
of this discussion is that scholars should take great care
in their research to ensure that the theoretical concepts
they emphasize are reflected in the typology that they
rely on. Categorical typologies, for example, allow schol-
ars to avoid making any assumptions about the linear-
ity of the path from dictatorship to democracy, but can-
not shed light on dynamics of political liberalization. At
the same time, continuous typologies can tell us about
whether systems are moving to or away from differ-
ent gradations of authoritarianism, but mask political
changes occurring within countries from one equally au-
thoritarian regime to the next (e.g., Iran transition from
the Shah’s rule in 1979 to the theocratic regime in power
today; Conroy-Krutz & Frantz, 2017). Given that research
on authoritarianism suggests that pseudo-democratic
institutions prolong authoritarian survival, how do we
know whether the adoption of political institutions that
broaden participation and contestation is indicative of a
political system that is less authoritarian as opposed to a
sign of a savvy regime boosting its odds of survival?
Relatedly, a second critical debate has to do with
the mechanisms through which pseudo-democratic in-
stitutions influence authoritarian survival. Some schol-
ars posit that such institutions bolster survival because
they serve as tools for mobilizing supporters and signal-
ing strength to challengers (Geddes et al., in press); oth-
ers assert that they enable dictators to commit to power-
sharing deals (Magaloni, 2008); and others put forth that
they are arenas in which regimes can provide policy con-
cessions to rivals (Gandhi, 2008). It is possible that all
of these pathways are at play, perhaps dependent on
the type of institutions under analysis. Yet, future re-
search is needed to connect the dots and inform our un-
derstanding of how, precisely, pseudo-democratic insti-
tutions confer survival gains, and under what contexts.
Importantly, if the vast majority of dictatorships today
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feature pseudo-democratic institutions, then what type
of analytical leverage do we gain by stating that they
prolong survival? Future research is also needed to dig
deeper into the full range of institutions that dictator-
ships employ tomaintain control, aswell as examine how
the rise in pseudo-democratic institutions across dicta-
torships has influenced their use of other survival instru-
ments, such as repression.
4. Conclusion
The field of authoritarian politics has expanded consider-
ably in the past twodecades or so.Wenowknow that dic-
tatorships are not all the same and that the differences
among them often have important consequences for
policies of interest (Ezrow & Frantz, 2011). We also know
that most dictatorships today feature the same types of
institutions that we typically associate with democracies,
even though they serve very different purposes (Gandhi
& Lust-Okar, 2009). These advances have brought with
them new debates, suggesting there aremany promising
avenues for future research in the years to come.
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